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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- VS. -
MELVIN CANFIELD, 
Defenden t-Appellant. 
Case No. 
10559 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Melvin Canfield, was convicted 
of the crime of murder in the second degree on jury 
trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was bound over for trial in the 
district court and charged by information with the 
crime of murder in the second degree. Jury was had 
m the District Court of Salt Lake County on Septem-
ber 27, 1965. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as 
charged, and the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson im-
posed sentence upon the appellant of confinement 
for the indeterminant sentence provided by law. 
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Appellant's appeal was not timely filed, and 
respondent filed a motion to dismiss which was 
taken under advisement by this court and denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent submits that the following state-
ment of facts is more in keeping with the rule that 
the evidence on appeal will be viewed in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, and is more in 
keeping with the actual state of the record. 
The appellant was charged in the information 
with killing Douglas Holland on May 10, 1965, in 
Salt Lake County in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 76-30-1 to -3 (1953) (R. 1.). 
The deceased was killed as the result of a gun-
shot wound received at about 9:52 p.m. at 649 South 
5th East in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 142, 170). The de-
ceased was married to Dixie Holland. They had two 
children, but were separated (R. 247). A complaint 
for divorce had been filed by the deceased' s wife 
on September 18, 1964, to which the deceased had 
filed a counterclaim (R. 337). At the time of the kill-
ing the divorce action was pending (R. 338). The de-
ceased was living at the place where the shootinCJ 
occurred and also had a small corporate business 
there. The deceased's wife was living at 4351 South 
13th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. The property where 
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Dixie Holland resided was owned by the deceased 
(R. 247). The deceased was under a restraining order 
keeping him from the premises where his wife re-
sided, except he retained a right to visit his children 
on Wednesdays and certain weekends (R. 338, 339). 
The appellant is, according to Dixie Holland, 
a friend she met in early 1965 (R. 344). A neigh-
bor of Dixie said the appellant was with Mrs. Hol-
land quite frequently and estimated he was at her 
home fifty percent of the time (R. 454, 455). Mrs. Hoi-
land testified he only stayed at her residence when 
she was afraid of her husband or was not feeling 
well, and that on these occasions they slept in sepa-
rate rooms (R. 353). She did admit that she and the 
appellant went to movies and bars together (R. 357), 
and saw each other frequently (R. 357, 360). 
Dixie likewise testified that she was considering 
marrying appellant's brother, Ralph, and that an-
other brother, Jack, had also been at her house 
(R. 362). 
On Mother's Day in May, 1965, Dixie went to 
Smithfield to visit (R. 346). The deceased came to her 
house where he found clothes of the appellant and 
some clothing of the appellant's brothers. He broke 
glass in the house and tore up the clothes (R. 301, 
347, Exhibit 30). Subsequently, Dixie returned and 
saw the condition of the house and moved in with 
a friend, Mara Jones (R. 349). 
The appellant was informed of what had hap-
pened by Dixie (R. 368). Dixie had, according to her,1 -1 Dixie Holland was an extremely evasive witness and not friendly to 
the State's case (cf. R. 369 and her testimony generally). After her husband 
was shot she made no inquiry as to his well being <R. 370). 
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borrowed a rifle from appellant at an earlier date to 
provide protection from deceased (R. 357). The rifle 
had been loaded, and was placed in her car (R. 349). 
The appellant borrowed Dixie's car, and although 
appellant testified he did not know the gun was in 
the car until he got to the house of deceased, Ardith 
Wiley testified that she overheard a conversation 
between appellant and Dixie at a bar earlier on May ; 
10th at which time Dixie told appellant the gun was 
in the car (R. 458). Ardith also had told appellant ii 
he stayed away there would be no trouble (R. 458). 
According to Ben Holland, father of the de-
ceased, earlier on the night of May 10th around 8:00 
p.m., his son received a phone call (R. 249). The 
call upset his son, and his son repeated the words 
on the phone, "Wipe me out, huh" (R. 253, 254). Tlw 
circumstances surrounding the call and the conver-
sation were received only to show the impact on 
the deceased, and the jury was so cautioned by the 
court (R. 253). 
After receiving the call the deceased and his 
father went to the police station to seek assistance 
(R. 258). The police advised the deceased to seek a 
complaint from the city prosecutor the next day 
(R. 285). The deceased and his father then returned 
to the deceased' s office (R. 259). 
The appellant, after borrowing Dixie's car, to 
gether with the appellant's father and two friends. 
Ted Hildebrand and Gordie Adamson, went to th2 
deceased' s place (R. 392). They had been drinkinrJ 
at the Kozy Korner Bar at 6th West in Salt Lake Citv 
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According to the appellant he went to deceased's 
house to "collect" for his clothes in order to obtain 
money for the purpose of buying more beer (R. 317, 
398). 
When they arrived at the deceased' s place they 
pulled in the driveway at the side of the house and 
honked the horn (R. 317, 393). The deceased's father 
went out and asked them to leave, telling them it 
they didn't there would be trouble (R. 262). Accord-
ing to the appellant's father the appellant then said 
to Mr. Holland, "Tell that chicken-shit son of yours 
to come out and pay for my clothes" (R. 317). The 
deceased then came out on the porch and said, ''I 
believe I am the one you're looking for" (R. 262). 
The deceased had a shot gun and fired a round 
down into the ground in the general direction of 
the car, but quite a safe distance from it (R. 263, 152, 
242). Thereafter, the deceased started back into the 
house (R. 263). The deceased' s father saw a gun mov-
ing up in the back of the car (R. 263). According to 
Ben Holland and appellant's father, Don Canfield, 
about twenty to thirty seconds passed, then appel-
lant shot the deceased in the hip with a 30.06 rifle 
m. 318, 263). At the time of the shooting the deceased 
was fumbling for the latch on the door to get back 
inside (R. 263). According to investigating officers 
there was a light directly across the street, one slight-
ly up the street, and light from the house,2 so that 
the area was well lighted (R. 144, 145). The deceased 
was also wearing a white shirt (R. 154). 
' The light from the house was corroborated by appellant. 
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The appellant then backed the car out of tho 
driveway and as he drove down the street with thE 
lights off, deceased's father tried to shoot back w1fr: 
the deceased's gun but it would not fire (R. 264, 2651. 
He handed the gun to deceased who fired a sho1. 
but apparently not in the area of the car (R. 265, 166 
161). 
According to the appellant's father, when they 
went to the Holland place, he and his son under 
stood it was for a fight (R. 316, 321, 331). They went 
to deceased' s place because it did not appear that 
deceased was going to come to the bar to fight 
(R. 333). As a result of the wound in the hip Holland 
died (R. 187, 205). 
The appellant's father acknowledged his sor. 
was a hunter and a good shot (R. 316). The appellanl 
said he shot in self-defense, and only intended to 
"wound" (R. 400). He also said after the first shc1 
deceased again pumped his gun. He acknowledged 
fifteen to twenty seconds passing between the dr:-
ceased' s shot and his, and said it could have been 
thirty seconds (R. 399, 426). Appellant also con-
tended he had not seen the rifle he used until Adan~ 
son gave it to him from the back seat after the firsi 
shot was fired (R. 403). 
Around April 22, 1965, the deceased had chased 
appellant from deceased's wife's house with a han~: 
mer (R. 386). Subsequent thereto, the appellant stateo 
in the presence of Ardith Wiley that he would kiL 
the deceased if he came around (R. 455)_ 
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The appellant was a convicted felon and the 
deceased had served time in jail for contempt in 
connection with his divorce action, had also been 
arrested, and was said to be violent against his wife. 
The jury, based on the above evidence, re-
turned a verdict of guilty. 
Other facts that may be relevant will be dis-
cussed in the argument portion of this brief. 
-ARGUMENT-
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE 
MURDER. 
The appellant contends the evidence is insuf-
ficient to sustain his conviction for the crime of sec-
ond degree murder. The basis of appellant's urging 
is (1) the evidence does not demonstrate sufficient 
proof of the elements of the crime, primarily malice. 
and (2) the evidence does not overcome the appel · 
iant's defense that he shot in self-defense. Respond-
Pnt submits the contentions approximate the friv-
olous. 
The respondent submits that the appellant has 
'liolated the principle that in appraising the suffi-
~iency of a jury's verdict of guilty the evidence with 
:ill its inferences will be viewed in a light most favo!-
·:ihle to the jury's verdict. In State v. Ward, 10 Utah 
'.d 34, 35, 347 P.2d 865, 869 (1959) this court observed 
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as to the standard applicable to appellate review in 
cases comparable to this: 
The rules governing the scope of review on ap-
peal as to the, sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the verdict are well settled: that it is the prerogative 
of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
and to determine the facts; that the evidence will be 
reviewed in the light most favorable to the verdict· 
an4 that. if when so viewed it appears that the jury 
actmg fairly and reasonably could find the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not 
be disturbed. 
In State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 214, 357 
P.2d 183, 186 (1960) this court commented: 
We reverse a jury verdict only where we con-
clude from a consideration of all of the evidence and 
the inferences therefrom viewed in the light most 
favorable to such verdict that the findings are un-
reasonable. 
Approaching the case from these standards 1 
leaves no doubt as to the justification for the jury's 
verdict. 
Although the deceased had torn up some 
clothes of the appellant, this act had occurred d 
substantial period of time before the killing. The 
destruction of the clothing could be found to have 
been precipitated by appellant's having been livin~ 
with the deceased's wife. The appellant was told cf 
the act. He knew that there was a gun in the de-
ceased' s wife's car. He borrowed the car. He'd been 
drinking. According to the appellant's father the de-
ceased and his companions sought out the deceased 
to have a fight. By the appellant's own admission he 
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went to the deceased' s home to "collect" for his 
clnthes. He says he only sought money; however, 
the father's testimony, the presence of the com-
panions, the loaded rifle, and the statement of appel-
lant to the deceased' s father to "tell that chicken-shit 
son of yours to come out and pay for my clothes" all 
lead to the conclusion that appellant went to the 
deceased' s house for the purpose of getting even. 
When appellant arrived at the deceased's place, 
deceased' s father advised them to leave to avoid 
trouble. This brought noting but an aggressive, ob-
scene remark from the appellant, evidencing a state 
of mind bent on vengeance. When deceased came 
out of the house, although armed with a shotgun, he 
shot the gun into the ground in an obvious warninq 
fashion. He then turned to the side (R. 436), and was 
attempting to re-enter the house when he was shot. 
No violence was at that time being offered to the 
appellant. Although appellant says the deceased 
pumped his gun, no other witness corroborated this 
testimony, and the testimony of the deceased's father 
supports a contrary conclusion. Twenty to thirty sec-
onds passed before appellant shot, enough time for 
the appellant to remove himself from the area. In-
stead the appellant, a hunter and good shot, moved 
the bolt action on the rifle, slid a round into the 
chamber, aimed, and by his own admission shot de-
ceased intending to wound him. He, in fact, killed 
him while intentionally doing an act calculated to 
oroduce great bodily harm. 
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Thereafter, contrary to appellant's claim of self. 
defense, he drove the car away with lights out, hid 
it in a remote place, and gave the gun to one of his 
companions to dispose of. He did not contact th12 
police. The other witnesses to the shooting who 
might support appellant's contention of self defense 
were never called as witnesses. The only two per-
sons testifying at trial who witnessed the event were 
Don Canfield, appellant's father and Ben Holland, 
deceased's father. Both witnesses' testimony is fully 
supportive of the conclusion that appellant, the 
aggressor, shot the deceased out of malice, and that 
he went to deceased's place with the intent to fight. 
The evidence is clear that the jury could find a suf-
ficient time period between the shot of the deceased 
and the shot the appellant fired. The jury could also 
find that by the way deceased was turned, he was 
trying to get back into his house when shot, and that 
the area was sufficiently well lighted to apprise the 
appellant that he was not in danger, and that he 
killed out of vengeance. Further, the shot of the de-
ceased was in the nature of a warning shot and the 
jury could find not only that there was no danger to 
appellant, but that he was the aggressor from the be-
ginning. Under Utah law murder in the first degree 
is specifically mentioned and defined; however, the 
only reference to murder in the second degree is: 
"Any other homicide committed under circum· 
stances as would have constituted murder at com-
mon law is murder in the second degree." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-30-3 ( 1953). 
Thus, excluded from second degree murder are 
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the instances of use of poison, lying in wait, felony 
murder, malicious and premeditated killing, and 
killing under circumstances evidencing a depraved 
mind. All other killings with malice, with the intent 
to kill or do an act likely to produce great bodily 
harm are murder in the second degree. With ref-
erence to the required intent for second degree 
murder, this court said in State v. Russell. 106 Utah 
116, 126, 145 P.2d 1003, 1007 (1944): 
( 1) An intention or design previously formed to kill 
or cause great bodily injury; or (2) an intention or 
design previously formed to do an act or omit to do 
an act, knowing that the reasonable and natural con-
sequences thereof would be likely to cause death or 
great bodily injury .... 
Thus the Russell case adopted the recognized rule 
that unpremeditated murder can be satisfied by one 
of two intentions: first, the intent to kill, or second, 
the intent to do great bodily harm. The finding of 
either intent is sufficient to warrant a conviction. 
This court restated and further clarified the in-
tent requirement for second degree murder in State 
v. Jensen, 120 Utah 531, 532, 236 P.2d 445, 445 (1951): 
With respect to his intent: It is the established 
law of this state that in order to make the crime of 
second degree murder the defendant must have in-
tended to either (a) kill, or (b) do great bodily harm, 
or ( c) do not act which would naturally and probably 
cause death or great bodily harm to the deceased. 
Thus the intent need only be to do great bodily 
narm, to kill, or do an act that would naturally and 
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probably cause death or great bodily harm to the de-
ceased. The facts here clearly support such an intent. 
Indeed, the admission of appellant was to the effec1 
that he intended to wound the deceased, and he 
used a high-powered rifle. The probable conse-
quences were obvious. 
In State v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 102, 396 P.2d 
414 ( 1964) this court upheld a conviction for second 
degree murder where the killing resulted after a 
gang contest. The court was in no way troubled 
about the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the 
conviction. See also State v. Frayer, 17 Utah 2d 282. 
409 P.2d 968 (1966). Other decisions of this court have 
sustained a conviction of murder in the second de-
gree in similar instances. State v. Kukis, 65 Utah 362, 
237 Pac. 476 (1925). In that case this court upheld a 
conviction for second degree murder where de-
fendant shot towards a train carrying workers to fl 
mine during a strike. See also State v. Martinez, 56 
Utah 351, 191Pac.214 (1920). 
Generally, the term "malice" means an inten-
tional act. Williams, Criminal Law § 30 (2d ed. 1961). 
If the common law standard is to be applied, a shot 
fired to induce fear or wound is done maliciously. 
Ward v. Regina, 1 C.C.R. 356 (1872). Simple malice 
is an entirely different thing than the malice afore 
thought required in first degree murder, but even sr 
it generally means to distinguish those "killings for 
which no pardon could be expected from those 
done in self-defense or by misadventure." Turner 
Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 9 104 (18th ed. 
(1962). 
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To the same effect is Clark & Marshall, Crimes 
5.05 (6th ed. Wingersky rev. 1958), where it is 
stated: 
In its popular sense, the term 'malice' means 
hatred, ill will or hostility to another, but this is not 
necessarily its meaning in law. In its broadest legal 
sense, it means the state of mind of a person, irres-
pective of his motive, whenever he consciously vio-
lates the law. 
The appellant in this case certainly had the re-
quired intent and acted with malice and the jury 
was justified in so finding.3 
Appellant's contention that the evidence shows 
he acted in self-defense is equally unmeritorious. 
The shot by the deceased was provoked by the ap-
pellant and his companions, and the phone call 
made to him before the visit of the appellant (which 
the jury could conclude was from either appellant 
or his companions) indicated appellant was the 
aggressor. Under such circumstances he may not 
claim the right of self-defense; further the facts here 
presented are such that the jury could reasonably 
conclude that the appellant did not shoot the de-
ceased in self-defense. 
A killing may be justified if done while "resist-
ing any attempt to murder any person .... " Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-30-10 (1) (1953). There was no attempt 
to murder any person. The jury could reasonably 
find appellant went to deceased's place to commit 
violence and deceased shot into the ground in an 
3 . The common law courts would clearly support a finding of guilty in 
~11' case. See Rex v. Miller, Viet. L.R. 355 0951); See generally Stephen, 
igest of the Criminal Law § 244(a) (5th ed.). 
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effort to dissuade appellant and his companions. 
Equally applicable is the same conclusion as to de-
ceased's possible intent to do "great bodily injury." 
A killing may also be justified "when committed in 
the lawful defense of such person [doing the killing J 
... when there is reasonable ground to apprehend 
a design to commit a felony or to do some great 
bodily injury and there is imminent danger of such 
design being accomplished .... " Utah Code Ann.~ 
76-30-10 (3) (1953). Appellant's brief conspicuously 
omits the remainder of the foregoing subsectio·1 
which requires that the killer " ... must really and i:-i 
good faith have endeavored to decline any further 
struggle before the homicide was committed." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-30-10 (3) (1953). 
The evidence clearly demonstrates that the ap-
pellant was the aggressor in going to the deceased'.:: 
place of residence and business; that he was asked 
to leave by deceased' s father; that he went to fight. 
that deceased shot into the ground; and that ther2 
after deceased attempted to retreat. The time sp:J:! 
was sufficient to allow appellant to "decline an·/ 
further struggle", however, he shot and killed de-
ceased. There is, therefore, no legitimate basis fer 
reversal. State v. White, 40 Utah 342, 121 Pac. 57? 
(1912); State v. Law, 106 Utah 196, 147 P.2d 324 (19441 
In the Law case, cited in appellant's brief, the co' . .::'. 
found in comparable circumstances of similar lega'. 
import that the issue was fer the jury. In this ca::-2 
the issue was for the jury and L.~e conviction W0.3 
justified. 
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Further, the deceased would have had the right 
to fire in self-defense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-10 (2) 
'.1953). Obviously, the matter was for the jury and 
their verdict cannot be said to be unreasonable. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
RULING ON THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. 
The appellant contends that the trial court com-
mitted error in admitting the testimony of deceased's 
father concerning statements made by the deceased 
during a telephone conversation between the de-
ceased and someone else a few hours before the 
shooting. The record shows the trial judge admitted 
such evidence only to show deceased's condition 
and state of mind at the time of the phone call. 
The record reflects the following (R. 253): 
THE COURT: ... and for the record the Court will 
reverse its ruling and permit the witness to answer. 
I'll explain to the Jury that the Court, having heard 
counsel in connection with this matter, is of the 
opinion that the material requested, which question 
comes under an exception to the hearsay rule and 
would admonish you in this connection that the an-
swer given is not proffered by the State to prove the 
truth of the facts contained within the statement 
that will now be made but as evidence of things that 
were said of the condition and state of mind of the 
deceased at the time when these statements were 
made. 
MR. BANKS: And to explain his subsequent ac-
tions. 
THE COURT: It is offered only for those purposes. 
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Q. (By Mr. Banks) As a caution, Mr. Holland, I 
want you to answer specifically the questions and not 
offer any opinions or anything that he might have 
said to you or you said to him. So, now, at this time 
I want to ask you as nearly as you can recall just 
what your son said into the phone at that time. 
A. 'No, but how about starting with you?' And then 
there was a pause and, 'You are doing quite a lot of 
talking. Who am I talking to? Gordie. Gordie, who? 
Gordon Adamson.' And then there was some conver-
sation I didn't get and he didn't say anything. It ran 
for a little while and then he said: 'It doesn't make 
any difference who can lick who but one way or an-
other something has got to be done to stop this mak-
ing a hangout of my home.' And there was not 
much said then for a little while and then: 'Wipe me 
out, huh? Just where are you? 1216 Pacific Avenue, 
huh? How long are you going to be there? How about 
meeting you there in thirty minutes?' And that was 
about all that I recall. 
Since the evidence was not used to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted it was not hearsay. Mc-
Cormick, Evidence § 225 (1954), states the definition 
of hearsay as follows: 
Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evi-
dence, of a statement made out of court, such state-
ment being offered as an assertion to show the truth 
of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its 
value upon the credibility of the out-of-court 
asserter. 
Therefore, by definition the testimony of de-
ceased's father was not hearsay. Further, a wel
1 
recognized exception to the hearsay rule is that evi 
dence otherwise relevant may be considered t: 
show the state of mind of a person, or the reactior 
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of a person to a stated phrase. McCormick, supra, 
~ 228. McCormick op. cit. p. 464 observes: 
When it is proved that D made a statement to X, 
with the purpose of showing, circumstantially, the 
probable state of mind of X, such as notice, knowl-
edge, or motive, or to show the information which X 
had as bearing on the reasonableness or good faith of 
the subsequent conduct of X, the evidence is not sub-
ject to attack as hearsay. The same rationale applies 
to proof by the defendant in cases of assualt or homi-
cide of communicated threats made to him by the 
person whom he is alleged to have killed or assaulted. 
If offered to show his reasonable apprenhension of 
danger it is not offered for a hearsay purpose. Its 
value for these purposes does not depend on the truth 
of the statement. 
See also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1790 (3rd ed. 
(1940). 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 1789 (3rd ed. 1940) 
notes: 
Wherever an utterance is offered to evidence the 
state of mind which ensued in another person in con-
sequence of the utterance, it is obvious that no as-
sertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of it, 
and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far as 
the Hearsay rule is concerned .... 
Justice Wade observed in John C. Cutler Ass'n. 
v. De Jay Stores, 3 Utah 2d 107, 115, 279 P.2d 700, 705 
0 955) (concurring opinion): 
However, if the fact of whether or not the statement 
was made is a material issue in the case, or the state-
ment accompanies an ambiguous or equivocal act 
serving to complete and give it definite legal signifi-
cance it is a verbal act which constitutes a material 
fact in the case or if the fact that such statement was 
made is a circumstance which tends to prove a mate-
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rial issue in the case such a statement is not being 
used as testimonial evidence of the statement made 
on the credit of the person making the statement who 
is not a witness and therefore is not hearsay evi-
dence. Where the 'question is not whether the state-
ments are true, but whether they were made' such 
statments are not excluded by the rule against hear-
say. 
Accord, Hurst v. State, 101 Miss. 402, 58 So. 206 (1912) 
The statements made in the phone conversation 
were relevant to show the reason for deceased's 
having a shotgun; his fear and apprehension at the 
presence of the car appellant was in; his reason fo: 
going onto the porch; and even the reason for his 
pattern of conduct during the evening. Further. 
Gordie Adamson was present at the time of the kill-
ing, and his presence as well as the whole pattern 
of circumstances bears direct relation to the phone 
call. The fact that the call was not allegedly made 
by the appellant, but rather by a companion is o: 
no consequence, especially when appellant's fathe 
testified that they were going to the deceased's place 
to have a fight. The trustworthiness of the testimony 
is clearly demonstrated by what transpired. 
The final claim that the probativeness of the 
testimony was outweighed by the possible prejudice 
is not of concern since the determination of such·~ 
matter rests within the sound discretion of the tric. 
court, and secondly, the evidence was hardly o: 
prejudicial as appellant's father's testimony of 
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projected fight and the actual killing. Obviously, 
there is little merit to the appellant's contention. 
Finally, the trial court carefully limited the pur-
pose of the testimony, and in the absence of proof to 
the contrary, it must be assumed that the jury fol-
lowed the court's instructions. 
Based on the foregoing discussion appellant's 
contention that the testimony of deceased's father 
was improperly admitted is wholly without merit 
and provides no basis for a claim of error let alone 
prejudicial error. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED A PROF-
FER OF EVIDENCE OF DECEASED'S CHARACTER 
FOR VIOLENCE SINCE: 
A. The Evidence Lacked Proper Foundation. 
B. The Evidence Was Cumulative. 
C. The Evidence Was Not Directly Relevent In View 
of Appellant's Aggression. 
FURTHER, ANY CLAIM OF ERROR COULD NOT BE 
PREJUDICIAL IN VIEW OF OTHER EVIDENCE AND 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
It is submitted by the appellant that the trial 
court erred in not receiving evidence of deceased's 
violent nature. Quite obviously from the appellant's 
.-:-iwn brief there was substantial evidence of the de-
ceased' s violent nature, especially toward his wife. 
Further, the trial court expressly instructed the jury 
'1cll they could consider the evidence before them 
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of the deceased's violent nature on the appellant's 
claim of self-defense. For this reason and those fur_ 
ther set out herein it is submitted the trial courL 
ruling on a proffer made by appellant will not sup-
port a basis for a claim of prejudicial error. 
The appellant acknowledges in his brief, anJ 
some authorities support a conclusion that befor::o 
evidence of the deceased's violent character can b 
accepted there must be some communication of tha' 
fact to the accused. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 246 (3rd 
ed. 1940). A distinction must be drawn between evi-
dence received to show the deceased' s violent char-
acter and its effect on the accused, and evidence 
received as an explanation for the affray. See Wig-
more, supra§§ 63, 246. In the former case some juris-
dictions require a communication of the reputation 
or character to the accused. Appellant assumes tha; 
to be the applicable rule in Utah. 
Bearing this rule in mind it is necessary to ex-
amine the exact context of the trial court's rulinc:r 
The appellant called a Sergeant Strong to the stand 
apparently to offer evidence of a particular event. 
The proffer of appellant was (R. 448, 449): 
MR. LUND: At this time, your Honor I make a 
proffer of proof with regard to Sergeant Strong who 
has just been called to the stand for the purpose and 
reason to show or to present evidence with regard to 
the character of the deceased pursuant to the excep-
tion to the hearsay rule with regard to testimony of 
the violent nature of the deceased. It is submitted 
to the Court that the Defendant, Melvin Canfield, 
was not present at the time the action took placr 
about which this witness will testify, the only evidencr 
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in the record at this time being the reference to the 
incident without naming the date and place by the 
Defendant in Cross-Examination by the District At-
torney. 
THE COURT: Where he indicated he'd heard 
about-
MR. LUND: The evidence at that time, your Honor, 
was that the defendant indicated he had heard about 
a time when the deceased had threatened his brother 
and a couple others in a car in addition to two police 
officers without establishing the date as to when 
this instance took place and I submit, your Honor, 
that that reference to that particular happening tied 
into the testimony of the officers pursuant to the 
proffer of proof at this time is sufficient ground or 
sufficient foundation for this testimony to be admit-
ted at this time. 
The court then indicated that it must be shown 
that such evidence was known to the accused prior 
to the incident giving rise to the charge (R. 449). The 
appellant had on previous examination4 only said he 
knew of the incident but did not indicate he knew 
of it at the time of the killing (R. 413, 448). Appellant 
also on direct examination by his counsel had re-
sponded (R. 413): 
Q. Do you know whether or not he had a reputation 
for being violent? 
A. That's all I have ever heard about the man is 
that he is extremely violent and constantly waving 
guns around at people and threatening to kill them. 
---
4 The examination where accused testified as to the deceased's reputation 
· 'he rnrnrnunity was direct examination (R. 413). 
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Thus there was evidence in the record of the 
deceased's general reputation, but none showing ir 
was known to the accused at the time of the killina. 
This was according to the trial court a necessitj1 
(R. 450). The trial court then indicated it would allov1 
appellant to be recalled to establish the knowledge 
factor (R. 450). The appellant's counsel indicated ha 
would recall appellant, however, he never did bu! 
rested (R. 452). Even if we assume the very principle 
argued for by appellant, it is submitted that the 
initial failure to prove his knowledge and apprehen-
sion at the time of the incident coupled with the 
subsequent failure to offer proof when given a sec· 
ond opportunity, shows that the claim of error is 
not well taken. 
In addition it is submitted that the proffer of the 
appellant is not in accord with the position he now 
takes on appeal. Appellant's proffer was only to the 
effect that he would call the police officer to show 
the time and place of the particular incident against 
the officer (R. 448, 449). Since the incident was itsell 
already a matter of record (R. 413), additional detail 
would not be anything but cumulative and im· 
proper. The trial court had sound discretion in this 
regard. Further, although the authorities are spht. 
evidence of specific acts of violence are not admis 
sible in many cases.5 People v. Rodawald, 177 N.Y. 
408, 70 N.E. 1 (1904); State v. Velsir, 61Wyo.476, 159 
P.2d 371 (1945); State v. Cavener, 356 Mo. 602, 202 
S.W.2d 869 (1947); Home v. State, 116 So. 2d 654 
h · e Cf 5 This court does not appear to clearly have passed on t e 'u~h 225 
State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 Pac. 497 (1911); State v. Mares, 113 
192 P.2d 861 <1948). 
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(Fla. App. 1959); Rothblatt, Handbook of Evidence 
for Criminal Trials, 252-253 (1965). Consequently, it 
is submitted the trial court did not commit error 
prejudicial to appellant. 
Further, it is submitted that where the record 
otherwise was repleat with evidence showing the 
hammer assault by deceased on the appellant, as-
saults or threats against deceased's wife, and the ap-
pellant's own testimony of the deceased's aggres-
siveness including the tearing of the clothes, the evi-
dence proffered was cumulative and the trial court 
could exclude the same in its sound discretion. 
In addition, the evidence shows the appellant 
went to the deceased' s home under circumstances 
where he was the aggressor. This being the case 
the question of evidence of deceased's violent char-
acter was of limited concern to the jury and the trial 
court properly excluded it. Pointer v. State. 37 Ala. 
App. 670, 74 So. 2d 615 (1954); Weaver v. State. 200 
Ga. 598, 37 S.E.2d 802 (1946); State v. Malmay. 209 
La. 476, 24 So. 2d 869 (1946); State v. Wilson. 234 
Iowa 60, 13 N.W.2d 705 (1944). 
Finally, it is submitted that when appellant's 
claim is viewed in the context of the record in this 
case, even if the trial court's ruling were error, it 
could not have been prejudicial or affected his sub-
stantial rights. Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953). No 
i-',c1s1s for reversal can be validly claimed. 
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POINT IV 
THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT ON INSTRUCTIONS 
ON SECOND DEGREE MURDER IS ACADEMIC. 
In point IV of appellant's brief it is contended 
that the trial court should not have instructed on 
murder in the second degree because it was no! 
raised by the evidence. Since it is clear that the evi· 
dence supports the conviction for murder in the 
second degree the instructions were properly given. 
If the evidence had not supported the conviction 
the case would warrant reversal in any event. Thus, 
appellant's argument is academic. 
- CONCLUSION -
The evidence in the instant case clearly sup-
ports the appellant's conviction for second degree 
murder when the evidence is weighed in light ol 
the elements of the crime, and appraised on the 
basis of the reasonable inferences the jury was al· 
lowed to draw. The contention that the trial court 
committed error in ruling on the admissibility of the 
evidence does not stand up under examination ol 
the record. This appeal is without merit and the con· 
viction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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